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Four million people ages 55 to 64—13 percent of this age group—
do not have health insurance. As a result, they face increased risk of a 
decline in their overall health (Baker et al. 2001). This chapter explores 
what can and should be done to improve the health coverage of older 
workers in the 10 years before they become eligible for Medicare at 
age 65.
WHY SHOULD WE CARE?
Why should we be concerned about improving health insurance 
coverage for older workers? It’s not because they are more likely to be 
uninsured. On the contrary, it is younger workers—not older ones—
who are the most likely to lack health insurance (U.S. Census Bureau 
2005). Two subgroups of the near-elderly do have particularly low rates 
of coverage: low-income people and the unemployed. Even so, 55- to 
64-year-olds do not stand out from the pack. People who have low in-
comes or who are out of work are much more likely to be without health 
insurance, whatever their age (U.S. Census Bureau 2005).
Going without health insurance, however, is a much more serious 
matter at older ages. Workers in the 55- to 64-year-old bracket are par-
ticularly vulnerable when uninsured because they are more likely to 
have health problems or chronic conditions requiring medical treat-
ment. About one-fi fth of people in this age group have only fair or poor 
health, and a similar proportion have a work disability (NCHS 2005; 
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U.S. Census Bureau 2005). Even if an older person is healthy, develop-
ing an acute or chronic condition is an ever-present possibility and a 
source of worry.
Because older workers are more likely to be in poor health, they 
also fi nd it more diffi cult to obtain affordable health insurance in the 
individual market. Collins and her colleagues (2005) have aptly char-
acterized the situation: older workers pay more and get less. In 2002, 
the average premium paid for a single policy in the individual market 
by people aged 55 to 64 was $3,700, compared to $2,770 for those 
aged 40 to 54 and $1,660 for those under age 40 (Bernard 2005). Many 
older workers pay much more. For example, 26 percent of individu-
ally insured adults over age 50 pay more than $6,000. And those older 
workers who do obtain coverage typically face higher deductibles, less 
comprehensive benefi ts, and greater out-of-pocket costs (Collins et al. 
2005).
WHAT ARE THE OPTIONS?
In a paper for the National Academy of Social Insurance’s 2000 
conference, Nichols (2001) explored the pros and cons of various ways 
of expanding coverage for the near-elderly. He identifi ed several ap-
proaches, including the following:
• Expanding the coverage of Medicare or Medicaid;
• Allowing people to buy into existing risk pools, such as Medi-
care, the Federal Employees Health Benefi ts Program, or state 
employees’ programs;
• Providing tax credits for the purchase of public or private insur-
ance;
• Extending the period of time for which COBRA continuation 
coverage is available;1 and
• Creating new subsidy programs, risk pools, and purchasing ar-
rangements.
Nichols’s paper remains an excellent analysis of the pros and cons 
of these different approaches, so there is no need to review them here.
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WHAT HAS HAPPENED RECENTLY?
In the six years since the publication of Nichols’s chapter, most pro-
posals to expand coverage have focused on tax credits.
In its budget for fi scal year 2001, the Clinton administration pro-
posed to allow two groups of older workers to buy into Medicare: peo-
ple aged 62 to 64 who do not have employment-based or public health 
insurance, and a limited number of displaced workers aged 55 to 61. 
The benefi ts would have been fully fi nanced by premium payments, 
but participants would have been eligible for a tax credit equal to 25 
percent of the premium. The Congressional Budget Offi ce estimated 
that 1.3 million people aged 62 to 64 would participate in the buy-in by 
the tenth year of the program, as would 90,000 displaced workers. The 
Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) estimated that the tax credit would 
cost $8 billion over 10 years (CBO 2000).
In addition to the tax credit for the Medicare buy-in, the Clinton ad-
ministration also proposed a 25 percent credit for taxpayers of any age 
who purchase COBRA continuation coverage. The JCT estimated that 
the credit for COBRA would cost $13 billion over 10 years.
A similar but much more limited tax credit to help older displaced 
workers was actually enacted in 2002. The Trade Act of 2002 created 
the Health Coverage Tax Credit for two groups: 1) certain retirees who 
are 55 to 64 years old and whose pensions are paid by the Pension 
Benefi t Guaranty Corporation (PBGC), and 2) workers who receive 
Trade Adjustment Assistance.  The refundable credit pays 65 percent of 
premiums for a qualifi ed health plan, including COBRA continuation 
coverage and certain state-sponsored programs (IRS 2005). Few people 
are eligible for the credit, however, and even fewer participate. By one 
estimate, 25,500 households received the credit in 2004 out of approxi-
mately 118,000 households that qualifi ed (Dorn, Varon, and Pervez 
2005). The credit also appears to have had the unintended consequence 
of helping bankrupt employers off-load the cost of retiree health ben-
efi ts onto the taxpayer at the same time that they shift the cost of pen-
sions to the PBGC.
The Bush administration’s 2006 budget proposed a refundable credit 
for individually purchased health insurance, at a cost of $64 billion 
over 10 years (CBO 2005). Although the maximum subsidy percentage 
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would nominally be 90 percent for those with incomes up to $15,000, 
the credit for an adult would be limited to $1,000. As noted earlier in 
the chapter, however, this amount is far below the prices actually faced 
by older people in the individual insurance market.
Not surprisingly, an analysis by Burman and Gruber (2005) fi nds 
that the proposed credit would increase insurance coverage primar-
ily among the youngest and healthiest workers. Older workers would 
likely lose coverage on balance, as the credit for individual insurance 
caused employers to drop group coverage. An estimated 1.8 million 
people would gain coverage on net, but 3.4 million people would lose 
employer-sponsored insurance, and 1.3 million of those would become 
uninsured (Burman and Gruber 2005). As modifi ed in the 2007 budget, 
the proposed credit would be available only for the purchase of a high-
deductible health plan.
ADVANTAGES OF UNIVERSAL PROGRAMS
Although tax credits have been getting most of the recent attention, 
expanding health insurance coverage through a universal program, such 
as Medicare, has several advantages over means-tested approaches.
First, participation rates for means-tested programs tend to be low. 
Only 20 percent of eligible people receive the Health Coverage Tax 
Credit. Participation rates in the Medicare Savings Programs are also 
very low, and a National Academy of Social Insurance study panel has 
recently recommended ways to increase participation (Ebeler, Van de 
Water, and Demchak 2006).
Second, means-tested programs are much more costly and compli-
cated to administer than universal programs. A simpler alternative is to 
provide benefi ts without regard to income or assets but to fi nance them 
through a proportional or progressive revenue source. Of course, pro-
grams should also be designed with ease of administration in mind, as 
seems not to have been the case for the Medicare drug benefi t.
Third, means testing creates disincentives for work and saving, 
especially for people who are eligible for many different subsidies or 
credits, each with its own benefi t reduction or phase-out rate. For that 
very reason, the UK Pensions Commission has recently recommended 
Van de Water chapter.indd   176 9/10/2008   1:33:10 PM
Improving Health Coverage before Medicare   177
moving away from reliance on means testing and toward more gen-
erous fl at-rate, universal benefi ts. The issue will become increasingly 
important here in the United States as retirees come to rely more heav-
ily on defi ned contribution pensions, which are counted as resources in 
means-tested programs such as Supplemental Security Income (SSI) 
and Medicaid (Parent 2006).
EXPANDING ELIGIBILITY FOR MEDICARE
In light of the advantages of universal programs, lowering the age 
of Medicare eligibility to 62 deserves another look. At a budgetary cost 
of only about 0.1–0.2 percent of payroll, this option would result in 
near-universal health care coverage among 62- to 64-year-olds (John-
son 2003). At the same time, it would reduce employer costs for retiree 
health benefi ts, lower both retiree and employer costs for COBRA con-
tinuation coverage, and help older workers who would otherwise have 
to seek nongroup insurance in the individual market.
A frequent objection to reducing the age of eligibility for Medicare 
is that it would entice more people to retire early on reduced Social Se-
curity benefi ts when we should instead be promoting longer work lives. 
Although this contention is doubtless correct as an empirical matter, it 
raises a serious ethical issue: is denying people health insurance an ap-
propriate way of encouraging them to work longer?
When thinking about incentives, I can’t keep out of my mind a phrase 
that the French philosopher Voltaire penned over 250 years ago. Can-
dide, the hero of Voltaire’s satirical novella of the same name, quickly 
recognizes that all incentives are not created equal when he is told that 
the British navy kills an admiral from time to time simply to encourage 
the others—or, as Voltaire wrote it, “pour encourager les autres.”
Reducing the age of eligibility for Medicare could well be com-
bined with other steps that would encourage longer work lives, such 
as increasing the age of initial eligibility for Social Security. (In that 
context, Joseph White’s proposal to give a break to long-service work-
ers deserves serious consideration.)2 The incentives for employers 
to retain or hire older workers could also be improved by restoring 
Medicare to its position as primary payer for workers with employer-
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sponsored health insurance, as was the case before the Tax Equity and 
Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982. Changes such as these would offer 
much better ways of ensuring that people who live longer don’t regret 
their decision to retire early on reduced cash benefi ts.
Another objection to lowering the age of eligibility for Medicare 
is that it would reduce the incentive for employers to provide retiree 
health benefi ts. But since retiree health benefi ts seem to be disappear-
ing anyway, this argument has lost much of its force. Moreover, the 
new prescription drug benefi t has fi lled one of the major gaps in Medi-
care—and one of the major reasons that retirees needed supplemental 
coverage.
In fact, it is equally plausible to argue that employers would be 
more likely to retain retiree health benefi ts for those who need them 
most—namely, workers who have retired early from extremely ardu-
ous or stressful jobs—if they were relieved of the pressure to provide 
benefi ts to those over age 62. Reducing the age of eligibility for Medi-
care would be consistent with other recent changes designed to reduce 
the cost of retiree health insurance to employers, such as the Health 
Coverage Tax Credit and the subsidies to sponsors of qualifi ed retiree 
prescription drug plans.
Another way of expanding Medicare would be to eliminate the two-
year Medicare waiting period required for those who become entitled to 
receive Social Security Disability Insurance. Since 40 percent of new 
benefi t awards to disabled workers are made to people aged 55 or over, 
this change would help a signifi cant number of the most needy and vul-
nerable older workers.
VALUES MATTER
The American public believes that good health care should be avail-
able to everybody, not just to those who can afford it. In one recent 
poll, 84 percent of Americans said that health care should be provided 
equally to everyone, just like public education (NewsHour with Jim 
Lehrer and Kaiser Family Foundation 2000). Most faith groups—in-
cluding denominations from Roman Catholic to Southern Baptist—
agree that health care should not be rationed solely on the basis of eco-
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nomics (U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops 1993; Southern Baptist 
Convention 1994). If our society acted on this belief, it would infl uence 
our answers to a wide variety of health policy questions.
For example, how can we encourage effi cient utilization of health 
care services? Many observers suggest that consumers should face fi -
nancial incentives to limit their use of care. But copayments and de-
ductibles—especially high deductibles—place a much greater burden 
on people with lower incomes. Is that fair?
What about access to care? Medicaid gives its low-income benefi -
ciaries a limited choice of providers and often makes them face long 
waits for appointments. Private plans provide fi nancial incentives to use 
generic drugs rather than brand names. Some analysts propose going 
a step further: they suggest that insurance plans offer differential ac-
cess to technology. One tier of benefi ts would provide access to current 
medical technology; another (and cheaper) tier would provide access 
only to technology that is 10 or 20 years old. Would that be morally 
acceptable?
What about paying for quality? Paying for quality is all the rage, 
and it sounds sensible. But if high-quality providers are paid more, will 
consumers be charged more to use them? If so, as Vladeck (2003) has 
said, people would “have the ‘choice’ of how much more they are pre-
pared to pay to reduce the likelihood that they will be maimed or killed 
during the course of [a] hospitalization.” Would it be equitable to al-
low or even encourage differences in the quality of care based on an 
individual’s purchasing power? Furthermore, how do all of these issues 
relate to efforts to eliminate racial and ethnic differences in health ac-
cess and outcomes, as promised in the federal government’s Healthy 
People 2010 initiative (HHS 2000)? 
Most important, in light of the strong public consensus for expand-
ing health coverage, we need to focus on fi nding solutions, not pointing 
fi ngers. Reischauer (1998) wrote the following about President Clin-
ton’s proposed Medicare buy-in: “While the . . . initiative raises com-
plex issues, it responds to a signifi cant problem. Rather than trashing 
the plan, as the opposition has done, policymakers should work to miti-
gate undesirable secondary effects that inevitably accompany efforts to 
expand access to affordable care.” That message still rings true today.
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Notes
 1.  The Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 (COBRA) pro-
vides certain former employees and their dependents access to temporary continu-
ation of health insurance coverage at group rates.
 2. White’s remarks came at the 2006 NASI Conference. See Chapter 9 of this vol-
ume, pp. 183–204.
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